Aaron Dishy is an IPilogue Writer and a 3L JD Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School.

The proposed Artificial Intelligence and Data Act (AIDA) would introduce greater regulation of the use and development of artificial intelligence (AI) in °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s private sector. On June 15^th, 2022, the Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry, François-Phillippe Champagne introduced Bill C-27, or the . Bill C-27 reiterates much of , tabled in 2020, reintroducing a modified Consumer Privacy Protection Act (CPPA) and Personal Information and Data Protection Tribunal Act (PIDPTA). However, Bill C-27 also introduced newly proposed legislation like AIDA which, if enacted, would make long advocated-for changes to °ä˛ą˛Ô˛ą»ĺ˛ąâ€™s AI regulatory landscape.

AIDA would create new assessment and risk-mitigation tools for the use and transparency of high-impact AI systems. It would establish persons responsible for monitoring AI systems, such as the Artificial Intelligence and Data Commissioner — their role is to assist the Minister in the administration and enforcement of AIDA. Monetary penalties for the AIDA contraventions are also set out to enforce trust and deter the reckless and fraudulent uses of AI. In this way, Bill C-27 and AIDA would direct Canada towards harmonization with international regulatory frameworks, like that of the .

With that being said, AIDA would be more limited in scope when compared to its EU counterpart. For example, unlike EU legislation, AIDA would not apply to both public and private sectors, and all federal government institutions would be exempt.^[1] Further, EU legislation sets out specific prohibited AI practices, alongside criteria for determining the degree of risk presented by any AI system. AIDA establishes no specific prohibited AI practices and distinguishes only between high-risk AI and all other systems; complex and salient matters are left to incoming regulation.

Beyond its limited scope, AIDA may be uncertain in its delineation of provincial and federal responsibilities. For example, AIDA’s consideration of “regulated activity,” would capture many elements of AI development and use, including “designing, developing or making available for use an artificial intelligence system or managing its operations.”^[2] This language indicates the legislation is pursuant to Parliament's trade and commerce power under section of the Constitution Act, 1867. However, the federal government may also intend provinces to legislate on intraprovincial uses of AI, notwithstanding the rarity of circumstances under which such AI systems would be developed.

Lastly, attention is required of the breadth of persons AIDA considers “responsible” for an AI system in the course of trade.^[3] It holds designers, developers and managers of AI systems subject to AIDA’s administrative and operational requirements. If those parties are expected to monitor or conduct audits of consumer deployment of AI systems, assessments must be made of risk potentials and mitigation from both perspectives. Additional regulation may be required in the full consideration of such perspectives.  

AIDA remains proposed legislation and may be modified prior to implementation. However, it represents a much larger move by international legal bodies to regulate the development and use of AI. Businesses must be prepared for greater AI regulation in Canada. Thankfully, informative and responsive policy for the consideration of AI systems is also being developed, such as a by the Law Commission of Ontario. If correctly applied, AIDA should empower more Canadians to engage with trustworthy and transparent AI systems.

^[1] This may be extended to exclude provincial departments or agencies by regulation as set out in s.3 of AIDA.

^[2] See s.5(1) of AIDA.

^[3] Ibid at s.5(2).

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Serena Nath is an IPilogue Writer and a 2L JD Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School.

Introduction

Despite great excitement and advancement in intellectual property rights, the rights of the visually impaired have been ignored. Copyright law reform has allowed publishers and innovators to prevent third-party reproduction of their work. However, this also included reproduction for the purpose of creating materials for those who are visually impaired. Innovators could simply not make visually accessible materials, or ignore the requests of those requesting reproduction in accessible formats, which drastically hinders access to materials for those who are visually impaired.

The Marrakesh Treaty

On June 27, 2013, rights for visually impaired individuals were finally advanced with the adoption of the Marrakesh Treaty, a copyright treaty. The allows for international adaption of printed material into formats that are friendly for visually impaired individuals, such as Braille or audiobooks, by setting international standards. As of May 2022, many countries have ratified the treaty. However, one notable exception was South Africa who could not sign the Marrakesh treaty because its copyright laws prohibited it.

Blind SA v Minister of Trade, Industry, and Competition (and others)

Things began to change when in when the South African Parliament adopted the Copyright Amendment Bill. This Bill proposed the insertion of into the act, which sets out general exceptions regarding protection of copyright works for people with disabilities. The addition of this section would allow for production of materials in an accessible format for those visually impaired. Despite the adoption of such a Bill, however, there has been a lengthy delay in the actual amendment of the Copyright Act to introduce section 19D. As a result, Blind SA, a visual impairment advocacy group, represented by SECTION27 challenged the constitutionality of South Africa’s copyright laws. Blind SA argued that the Copyright Act discriminates against people with visual impairment on the grounds of their disability by violating their right to equality, non-discrimination, dignity, education, freedom of expression, and participation in cultural life.

In , the Pretoria High Court ruled in Blind SA v Minister of Trade, Industry, and Competition (and others) that South Africa’s Copyright Act of 1978 is invalid for violating the rights of the visually impaired. By declaring the Copyright Act unconstitutional, the Marrakesh Treaty principles could be implemented into the Copyright Act. Additionally, the high court ordered that section 19D of the Copyright Amendment Bill be read into the Copyright Act.

Despite success in the Pretoria High Court, this declaration then had to be confirmed by the Constitutional Court, whose hearing took place on May 12, 2022. There, the Court  reserved judgement. At this point, then, it is anyone’s (educated) guess as to what the final decision will be. Despite this, a that the eventual ruling will be a victory for the visually impaired.

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Many jurisdictions have provisions that prohibit the registration of offensive marks in accordance with moral and public policy concerns. For example, section 9(1)(j) of Trade-marks Act prohibits the registration of “any scandalous, obscene or immoral word or device.”  and Australia[1] also enforce similar clauses. Therefore, while the decision in Matal has direct implications for US trademark law, it also raises a host of questions for trademark law around the world.

The amicus briefs filed in Matal present illuminating insights on how the Court may have taken a step too far. The  submitted by the American Bar Association (ABA) is a logical place to begin this analysis, given the foundational issue that was the focus of the submission. The ABA sought to correct the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on the distinction between trademark validity and trademark registrability. In addition to the Court confusing validity and registrability, a finding that section 2(a) of the Lanham Act violates the First Amendment would lead to uncertainty about the consequences of a finding of “unregistrability”. The ABA correctly pointed out that the Court of Appeals in Matal seems to have treated trademark validity and trademark registrability interchangeably, which may have had a compound effect on the final decision. The court did, however, state that the unregistrability on the Principal Register does not prevent a trademark from being used legitimately in commerce. However, the Court of Appeals seems to have also erroneously implied that a determination of unregistrability makes an otherwise valid mark ineligible for protection under the Lanham Act, which, according to the ABA, is incorrect. This means that Simon Tam’s proposed mark THE SLANTS may have been ineligible for registration prior to the ruling in this case, a finding of unregistrability is not determinative of whether or not a mark can be used in commerce

In the event of an infringement or unfair competition claims under the previous law, Tam could have protected his mark through the common law. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals stated that “[w]ithout federal registration, a trademark user cannot stop importation of goods bearing the mark …” While this was not directly relevant to Tam’s situation, it certainly has broad implications for cases to come. Regardless, it is inaccurate. Owners of unregistered trademarks have other federal causes of action at their disposal. Indeed, the ABA gave the example of the possibility of “filing a complaint pursuant to Section 337 of the Tariff Act before the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) to stop the importation of goods bearing the mark that violate those common-law rights.”[2] Moreover, valid yet unregistered marks may also enjoy protection against cybersquatting, according to the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act.[3] In addition, state law causes of action—such as likelihood-of-confusion-based causes of action for infringement, unfair competition, and deceptive trade practices—present other avenues for the owners of unregistered trademarks to enforce their intellectual property rights.

An interesting in support of the USPTO is that any decision the government makes in circumstances such as those giving rise to the dispute in Matal is not necessarily neutral because speech will be inevitably supressed. The brief states that “...a trademark registration is a government-issued document that makes it easier for its owner to suppress the speech of others...” because it is a right to exclude, contrary to the opinion of the Tenth Circuit in . This means that, in trademark law, the government is necessarily interfering with ˛ő´Çłľ±đ´Ç˛Ô±đ’s speech; whether it be the trademark owner’s in the case of a refusal, or competitors’ in the case of a trademark registration. This, according to the professors behind the brief, would “wreak havoc on trademark law”, but can be remedied by a decision in favour of the USPTO. This is because trademark law is content-based rather than viewpoint-based. Prior to this case, anyone could be caught under the disparagement clause, regardless of viewpoint. Disparagement is judged based on the content of the mark. Therefore, the law professors present a valid point when they state that “[u]nder the appropriate analytic framework, the bars of Section 2 reflect acceptable judgments about which symbols should receive legal protection as source identifiers, not penalties imposed on an actor doing business independently of the government.” In essence, the Court of Appeals erred in viewing the Lanham Act’s regulatory scheme as being presumptively unconstitutional because a trademark registration denial is seen as a ban on free speech.

The implications for trademark law are not the only concern with respect to the expansion of free speech when it comes to offensive marks. The of Native American Organizations agrees with the perspective of the law professors above in the sense that “[t]rademarks can function as instruments of speech-suppression precisely because they regulate commercial speech.” In this way, the government plays an important role in the operation of commerce, which facilitates the filtration of disparaging and racist marks. When the government exercised this role with respect to offensive marks prior to Matal, it did not strip the owner of the use of a trademark as a whole, but simply withheld the benefits that registration carries. Therefore, from this perspective, this case confirms the “longstanding use of derogatory Native American imagery”, which also alludes to the attention captured by the Washington Redskins case.

As such, concerns regarding freedom of speech became real in light of Matal, which may be a reason to think that the ruling in this case pushed the boundaries of free speech too far, despite the advantages that it carried for trademark owners. This, in conjunction with the wide range of international uncertainty that Matal has caused, is a factor that makes the decision slightly unsettling and casts doubt as to whether the step taken by the U.S. Supreme Court swung the balance too far in favour of free speech. The full range of these impacts, however, has yet to be seen given the recent issuance of this decision.

Saba Samanian is an IPilogue Editor and a JD Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School.

[1] Vicki Huang, “Comparative Analysis of US and Australian Trade Mark Applications for THE SLANTS” (2017), Eur IP Rev at 6[Huang].

[2] Tariff Act, 19 USC § 1337 (2012). See In re Certain Digital Multimeters, & Prods With Multimeter Functionality, Inv No 337-TA-588, USITC Pub 4210, 2010 ITC LEXIS 2867.

[3] Consumer Protection Act, 15 USC § 1125(d).

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