Emily Xiang is an IPilogue Writer, a Senior Fellow with the IP Innovation Clinic, and a 3L JD Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School.

For the first time in decades, the US Supreme Court will engage with enablement in patent applications. On November 4th, 2022, the Supreme Court to review the Federal Circuit’s decision in Amgen v Sanofi, against the . Specifically, Amgen seeks to appeal a , in which the court found Amgen’s patents invalid for lack of enablement. 

The requirement of enablement in US patent law is codified in , which requires that the specification of a patent application “enable any person skilled in the art…to make and use” the invention in question. The in Amgen v Sanofi is whether this statutory requirement governs enablement (that the specification teaches those skilled in the art to “make and use” the claimed invention) or whether it must instead enable those skilled in the art “to reach the full scope of the claimed embodiments” without “undue experimentation” (characterized by substantial “time and effort”). 

In 2014, Amgen sued Sanofi for infringing on its patents concerning drugs for lowering cholesterol. The genus patents specifically cover that bind to the PCSK9 protein in the body. The patents disclose the amino acid sequences for 26 antibodies that bind to one or more of 15 residues found on the PCSK9 protein. Importantly, the claims at issue are considered , in which the antibodies are not claimed based on their structural components but rather on what they do. 

On January 3rd, 2023, many interested parties submitted to offer the Supreme Court their take on the issue to be considered. For instance, in a brief submitted by a group of , it was argued that the Federal Circuit’s standard imposes “an impossible burden” on patentees and that such a decision represents “a categorical shift in thinking away from teaching the PHOSITA and towards a precise delineation of the boundaries of the claim”. The professors further submitted that such a heightened requirement would be especially burdensome for patentees seeking to protect their innovations in the fields of chemistry and the life sciences, as “a chemical genus with any decently large number of species will never be able to satisfy the new enablement standard”. 

Other parties in support of Amgen presented some other reasons as well. In their amicus brief, the stated that the court’s reasoning “leaves patent practitioners guessing about how to advise client-inventors regarding the extent of disclosure required”. The , warned of the adverse impact that the new enablement requirement might have on the effectiveness of patent incentives for investors to contribute towards research and development, especially in the case of startups and smaller companies.

Moreover, the has filed a motion for leave to participate in oral argument, claiming a “paramount and unique institutional interest and perspective” – that is, the perspective of individuals and companies working in the chemical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnology fields. CHAL asserts that the Federal Circuit’s enablement standard potentially jeopardizes the benefits of many modern innovations and that adhering to the plain meaning of 35 USC s. 112 should continue to be the prevailing approach.

The Supreme Court’s decision regarding the enablement standard for functional claims could also have wide-reaching implications that spill over into other fields, such as technology and computer-implemented inventions. By too narrowly focusing on the “full scope of the claim” and “undue experimentation” instead of on what those skilled in the art could determine from the specification, it is unclear how broader claims for (such as those that describe the desired result to be achieved by the AI rather than its structural components or any specific software solutions) might fare in the face of such a standard. 

Amgen v Sanofi is scheduled to be heard by the US Supreme Court in the upcoming Spring Term.

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Emily Xiang is an IPilogue Writer, a Senior Fellow with the IP Innovation Clinic, and a 3L JD Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School.

At last, the on the protectability of the subjects of ‘pop art’. In 1984, Vanity Fair magazine received a licence from photographer Lynn Goldsmith to use her 1981 portrait of Prince, which she had shot on assignment for Newsweek. Fast forward to 2017, when Vanity Fair published a special issue to pay homage to the recently deceased musician that featured ‘Orange Prince’ – Andy Warhol’s pop art depiction of Goldsmith’s photograph. The question of whether Warhol’s Prince silkscreens may be considered fair use has now made its way up to the US Supreme Court, and on October 12th of this year, . This is the outlining the arguments that were made in the matter of Andy Warhol Foundation for the Arts v Goldsmith.

In determining fair use according to the statute, one of the primary points of contention involved the meaning behind the of the alleged use. The Warhol Foundation contended that the purpose of ‘Orange Prince’ was to comment on modern society, thereby conveying unto the original an entirely different meaning and message. Lisa Blatt, representing Goldsmith, proposed that one may just as easily argue that the “purpose” of both uses was the commercial licensing of the works for publication. Blatt’s arguments were supported by Yaira Dubin, representing the Justice Department, who also highlighted the foundation’s commercial licensing of Warhol’s work, saying that “using another artist’s work as a starting point to turn around and compete directly with their original has never been considered fair.”

Of course, the magnitude of such a household name as Andy Warhol’s was not lost to the court. Justice Kagan questioned the influence such a name might have on the query: “Now we know who Andy Warhol was and what he was doing and what his works have been taken to mean. So it’s easy to say that there’s something importantly new in what he did with this image.” On the other hand, Justice Kagan also acknowledged that there must be a reason why Warhol’s art is hung up on the walls of museums: “[W]hy do museums show Andy Warhol? They show Andy Warhol because he was a transformative artist, because he took a bunch of photographs and he made them mean something completely different.” 

The Supreme Court judges addressed a statement made by the , which ruled in favour of Goldsmith. The Court of Appeals had warned that judges “should not assume the role of art critic and seek to ascertain the intent behind or meaning of the works at issue.” Justice Alito, in particular, seemed to disagree with the statement, pondering the kind of perspective that would be appropriate in determining such distinctions: “Well, suppose that [somebody]...made an almost exact copy [of the Mona Lisa]…If you showed [the two works] to most people today, they would say, well, all right, brown dress, blue dress, red dress, doesn’t make any difference, right?...But, if you called somebody who knows something about Renaissance art, the person would say that makes a big difference.”

The commentary strikes at the ambiguity often found in determining cases involving intellectual property, if only because there is an inherently subjective element to construing creations of the mind. However, though patent law has the “person of ordinary skill in the art” standard and trademark law has the “ordinary casual consumer somewhat in a hurry” standard, copyright law often relies on a judge’s evaluation of whether infringement has occurred.

There is much to be anticipated from the Supreme Court’s final decision, the kind of effect such a decision might have on the world of art and photography, as well as whether a ruling in favour of the foundation would indeed “decimate the art of photography by destroying the incentive to create the art in the first place,” as Blatt argues.

The post Warhol’s ‘Orange Prince’ Brought to Court: Part 2 (Arguments from Lynn Goldsmith) appeared first on IPOsgoode.

Emily Xiang is an IPilogue Writer, a Senior Fellow with the IP Innovation Clinic, and a 3L JD Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School.

Over 3 years have passed since New York’s District Court a ruling in the matter of Andy Warhol’s “Orange Prince”, and the ripples of the case have finally made their way up to the Supreme Court. On Wednesday, October 12th, 2022, the judges of the US Supreme Court heard from both sides, and considered whether Warhol’s , which he had based on a 1981 photograph of Prince by photographer Lynn Goldsmith, may be considered a use that is “fair”. 

The doctrine of fair dealing in Canada has long played an important role in balancing the scales of copyright law from leaning too far in favour of copyright holders. The fair dealing exceptions recognize certain uses of protected works as benefitting society, and thereby safeguard those uses from findings of infringement. The parallel doctrine in the US tracks along similar reasoning and is known as the ‘fair use’ doctrine. In determining whether a use of a copyrighted work is “fair,” courts consider numerous factors, including whether the use in question is “transformative” of the original material.

In , the Supreme Court was invited to assess whether a work was “transformative” when it conveys a different meaning or message from its source material, or whether, in cases where the accused work “recognizably derives” from its source material, judges are forbidden from deriving or considering such meanings. It was an engaging proceeding with an abundance of references to pop culture icons and current affairs, and was punctuated at times by laughter in the courtroom at an amusing hypothetical posited by one of the judges.  

Roman Martinez appeared on behalf of the Andy Warhol Foundation, and clarified the issue at hand, as well as the Foundation’s position: “[b]oth courts below agreed, and Goldsmith doesn’t dispute, that Warhol’s Prince Series can reasonably be perceived to convey a fundamentally different meaning or message from Goldsmith’s photograph. The question in this case is whether that different meaning or message should play a role, any role, in the fair use analysis. Our answer is yes.” Martinez argued that while Goldsmith’s original photograph captured a “vulnerable-looking Prince,” Warhol’s depiction turned it into a commentary on celebrity and fame – an entirely different meaning and message. 

The judges somewhat pushed back against this argument. Justice Elena Kagan suggested that in Hollywood, while a movie adaptation of a book might introduce plenty of new elements that may make a derivative work “transformative” under Martinez’s proposed test (“...new dialogue, sometimes new plot points, new settings, new characters, new themes”), one would still expect some sort of licensing agreement to be required.

Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas also commented on Martinez’s arguments, albeit in more lighthearted terms. The Chief Justice wondered whether a claimant who depicted Prince with “a little smile on his face” may advance the argument that the “meaning or message” of the work was fundamentally changed to convey that “Prince can be happy” or that “Prince should be happy.” Justice Thomas in turn asked Martinez to imagine the Justice at a Syracuse football game as a Prince fan, “which [he] was in the ‘80s.” Justice Kagan interjected, “No longer?,” to which Justice Thomas replied, “Well…so only on Thursday night.” This elicited some laughter in the courtroom. Justice Thomas continued, “And I decide to make one of those big blowup posters of ‘Orange Prince’ and change the colours a little bit around the edges and put ‘Go Orange’ underneath. Would you sue me for infringement?,” insinuating that the changes and add-ons may be considered to convey a new “message” to Warhol’s work, under the Foundation’s proposed test. In response, Martinez emphasized that the verdict in both scenarios would largely depend on the degree of transformation in meaning or message, as well as the other factors in the ‘fair use’ analysis, such that a holistic assessment may be applied.

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With ongoing concerns about IP infringement, it is possible that we’ll start to see stronger IP regulation. Arguably, this has already happened. Almost a decade ahead of the financial crisis, Time magazine reported a "" due to unauthorized copying on the Internet. This prompted similar calls for from Congress. One notable piece of legislation was the Digital Millennium Copyright Act from 1998, which criminalized the evasion of digital locks that control unauthorized copying. France followed suit with its own legislation, with Canada's version waiting in the wings. But with major players such as and abandoning these content controls, this solution may not be the way forward. Groups such as the still identify unauthorized copying as a major problem, and a new wave of regulation may be aimed at protecting IP.

Intellectual property also faces threats from abroad. The between America and rapidly developing countries is cause for alarm. As Westerners rely more and more on developing countries for inexpensive goods, information industries such as software, biotech, and media will become important economic engines at home. This cannot happen if trading partners ignore IP rights in software, art, and technology. . If this trade disparity cannot be resolved in negotiations, Western industries may call for stronger trade protections at home.

Much will depend on how the current economic woes are viewed. This recession might reveal the need for innovations and new products, now more than ever. Not only will innovation make industry more competitive, but valuable intellectual properties may help secure financing from cautious lenders. Government may try to promote this with stronger incentives for inventors. The Obama administration has promised in research, and new tax credits for R&D. Perhaps stronger IP protections would encourage innovation too, but these would have an impact long after the recession is over.

On the other hand, governments may regulate in ways that focus directly on individuals, rather than industries. Telecommunications companies have been bracing themselves for regulation by now President-elect Obama. This would stop service providers from shaping certain kinds of Internet traffic, particularly music and movie downloads. The new administration also promises to to all parts of the country by restructuring its funds and incentives. This may set the tone for broadband service around the world.

With diseases such as AIDS reaching a crisis-level in many regions of the world, we may see regulation that patent holders to license cheap versions of their life-saving drugs. Another solution may involve limiting IP protection, making it easier for other producers to make generic versions of patented drugs that they can sell for less than the patent holder. Would this involve adding more caveats to current IP regulation, or actually reducing regulation in terms of time and scope? Whichever approach it is, it could theoretically be justified in a new era of social activism in the marketplace. (Deregulating IP in the era of new regulation seems less odd if you recall the DMCA being passed at the height of deregulation. Perhaps IP is unique, and thus destined to ignore larger trends.)

Predicting how IP regulation will evolve depends on a lot of factors. It depends on whether the current IP system has failed consumers or creators, industries or individuals, or all of the above. It depends on whether the coming economic shift is a return to pragmatism, or a new era of social activism. And it depends on whether this is indeed a turning point for the economy, or merely a speed bump that will soon be behind us.

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