and worldwide have continued to express deep concerns about Big Tech firms and their extensive collection of personal digital data, which affects how markets operate and compete. In a I coauthored with Professor Kean Birch of żìČ„ÊÓÆ”, we dove into these policy materials, using to explore recurring themes in across various regions. Published by the , our work also sheds light on how the collection of personal data is portrayed in the latest review of competition laws, policies, and regulations, and the implications for evolving competition policy

Why Competition Policy Matters

Big Tech firms are powerful political-economic actors within the economy, especially when it comes to the mass collection and use of digital personal data. As , in a data-driven digital economy, they can therefore shape and dominate markets by structurally and strategically undermining competition through their constructed platforms—data-driven ecosystems that appear separate from the market. This capacity gives Big Tech firms structural and techno-economic power over their competitors, making it more important than ever for competition law to step up its game. Through a thematic policy analysis, our research reveals a series of key issues that policymakers around the world are identifying as important structural and techno-economic implications of Big Tech for competition.

Structural and Techno-economic Dimensions of Big Tech’s Market Power

A significant part of Big Tech firms’ market power lies in economies of scale, which can create tough barriers for new competitors to break through. For example, as points out, the high costs needed to start a business can be a genuine hurdle for newcomers, while established companies can handle regulatory costs much more comfortably. Additionally, the costs involved in switching from one provider to another can make users hesitant to change. As highlighted by , the digital economy has sped up the impact of these economies of scale, in part because personal data complicates how we understand market definitions in competition policy. The basic assumptions that guide competition policy often use price theory to define markets and identify anti-competitive behaviour. These competition frameworks therefore struggle to address situations involving seemingly ‘free’ goods (like search engines) or the trade of these free goods and services for personal data. , ).

Meanwhile, the techno-economic side of the power held by these Big Tech firms includes both the strategic and responsive growth of relationships involving technology and political-economics. This growth is aimed at connecting a range of stakeholders, including governments, businesses, users, and academia, with the infrastructures and platforms created by Big Tech.

Structural Implications of Big Tech for Competition

Scholars such as have highlighted the significance of the network effect as a key structural implication of Big Tech for competition policy. These companies have established themselves as intermediaries in building multi-sided market platforms. Network effects result from how the number of users in a network (e.g., social media platforms, search engines) increases the usefulness of the network to its users, thereby raising its attractiveness for new users. Consequently, as the noted in 2020, network effects lead to a self-reinforcing cycle in which users migrate to the fastest-growing network. With this network effect, Big Tech companies are amassing a startling amount of data, providing them with an enormous competitive advantage, creating barriers to rivals entering or thriving in relevant markets, and allowing the incumbent digital platform providers to expand into adjacent markets.

The second structural effect is connected to but distinct from the first: investments made by Big Tech firms mean they can scale up with lower-than-usual costs. As the UK's 2019  put it, ‘Both the scale and the data that the platforms possess on consumers make it hard for other players, including publishers, to compete.’ Economies of scale have provided significant benefits for Big Tech firms as they have grown quickly to dominate their markets. This is clearly becoming a cause for concern amongst policymakers worldwide (as seen in, e.g., , , , OECD 2022). The main negative effect of such economies of scale is the loss of market contestability: there are significant barriers to entry into digital markets because Big Tech incumbents benefit from first-mover technology advantages; there are also significant disparities in market information; and then there are disparities in the capacity to adjust prices because incumbents benefit from greater information (e.g., data collection) and higher processing capacity (e.g., computing infrastructure). 

The third structural issue identified in our paper is the gatekeeping role of these Big Tech companies in our societies and economies. Policymakers have thus noted that a few digital gatekeepers hold the keys to the crucial digital infrastructure that impacts our everyday lives—whether it's staying in touch with friends, finding job opportunities, or accessing information. Gatekeepers can control access to the users and their data, which can hold significant value for other firms wishing to connect with consumers. The fact that this vital digital infrastructure, including personal data, is largely provided by Big Tech, makes it tough for startups and competitors to enter the market.

Techno-economic implications of Big Tech for competition

The first techno-economic issue we identify is the capacity of Big Tech to enter adjacent markets through data collection. As the  pointed out in 2019, ‘The extensive amount of data available to Google and Facebook provide these platforms with a competitive advantage and assist with entry into related markets.’ Data-driven business models enable Big Tech to enter adjacent markets through the modular extension of technical standards and terms and conditions (e.g., APIs, SDKs, plugins).

The second techno-economic issue concerns the spread of market power through the creation of digital ecosystems as ‘walled gardens.’ An ecosystem is more than a platform: it is the configuration of technical devices, applications and software, platforms, users and developers, payment systems, terms and conditions, and other legal rights and claims and standards (see: Autoriteit Consument & Markt, 2019). As explained by the , through this ecosystem, end-users get locked in, reducing the opportunity for competition, even when products and services (e.g., Gmail, Facebook) are notionally ‘free.’

The third techno-economic issue follows the second: Big Tech reinforces its market power by creating ‘enclaves’ in which they govern economic activities. These enclaves are distinct from markets; they sit inside wider markets, , but gatekeepers can also establish the internal ‘rules of the game’ and control market information. Policymakers have highlighted various relevant business strategies and practices—including the setting of defaults, cross-selling, and self-preferencing—that reduce competition within these techno-economic enclaves.

Challenges of digital personal data for competition and competition policy

The mass collection and use of personal data by Big Tech therefore has structural and techno-economic implications for competition policy—implications with which policymakers around the world are now grappling.

A key consideration in these policy materials is the techno-economic dimension of data-driven leverage. Policymakers repeatedly observe that Big Tech enjoys a competitive edge, primarily because of its vast personal data reserves and its ability to limit other companies' access to this valuable information. Although any digital firm can gather personal data, having substantial data holdings boosts innovation potential and offers a notable business advantage. This concern has been underscored by the.

Already concentrated digital markets are likely to concentrate further without concerted action to change competition policy. Our paper demonstrates the growing awareness among policymakers of the important effects of Big Tech and personal data collection on competition and market power. Of course, there's also a looming concern that the winner-takes-all dynamics fuelled by data control could influence the future development of important technologies like artificial intelligence, which significantly depend on large training datasets.

'Damola Adediji is a Visiting Researcher with IP Osgoode and a Doctoral Candidate with the Centre for Law, Technology & Society at the University of Ottawa.

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Meena Alnajar is an IPilogue Senior Editor and a 3L JD Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School .

A protects your intangible property from others’ use, but what happens when patent protection operates in a way that ensures no other innovators can build upon a patented invention? When IP and competition clashes, authorities will step in to regulate as demonstrated in a recent dawn raid.

On September 13, 2022 the Swiss Competition Commission (“COMCO”) the pharmaceutical company Novartis’ headquarters in Switzerland at . A rather unusual visit, COMCO proceeded to raid the company’s headquarters for all information related to an unidentified . According to the regulator, the drug’s patent could be a blocking patent used to prevent competing products’ entry into the market. Novartis is allegedly protecting its dermatology drug by using one patent to launch proceedings against possible competitors in the market. Here we see IP and competition law colliding with blocking patents wielded as an anti-competitive tool.

A blocking patent can prevent another inventor from using the patent’s technology or improving it. A blocking patent is often cited by during the patent application examination phase to block a patent application or a patent’s challenger (such as those claiming an existing patent should be invalid). On July 22, 2021, held in Chemours v. Daikin that “[a] blocking patent is one that is in place before the claimed invention because such a blocking patent may deter non-owners and non-licensees from investing the resources needed to make, develop, and market such a later, ‘blocked’ invention.” A blocking patent is therefore broad in scope to deter people from innovating in any way related to the blocking patent. Overall, these patents are a helpful business tool, blocking a competitor to conserve the patent’s commercial success while also observing where competitors are attempting to . But when too successful, the blocking patent has a on competition. Innovators’ fear of overtakes their willingness to build on the invention and the blocking patent becomes an anti-competitive red flag to regulators.

In the Novartis , authorities are questioning whether Novartis is acting appropriately with its drug patent. The investigation is still in its and in the company have slightly fallen after the raid was announced. Regulators unexpectedly taking a business’ commercially sensitive information is not ideal. The investigation thus raises a further question, when does a business’ patent portfolio become anti-competitive and subject to a raid?

Patent rights and anti-competitive practices can overlap. Patent holders should take action to ensure that their IP use does not violate their jurisdiction’s competition law. Balance must be maintained in the patent system through the : setting strict patent content boundaries, preventing exclusive licensing that stops other competitors from market entry, and preventing restrictive selling practices where patent rights are used to price fix. While blocking patents can close the doors to competitors, these patents can open the doors for someone else, like regulators, to come in and conduct their information raids.

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Photo by Timusu ()

Meena Alnajar is an IPilogue Writer, IP Innovation Clinic Fellow, and a 2L JD Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School.

In March 2021, Rogers Communication Inc. announced an upcoming to buy Shaw Communications Inc for a US$26 billion takeover. If successful, Rogers will become Canada’s -largest cellular and cable company operator. Canada would resultingly have wireless providers to choose from instead of four. This deal is now facing opposition from some of Canada’s key regulatory powers. On March 3 2022, Canada’s of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Francois-Phillippe Champagne stated that “The wholesale transfer of Shaw’s wireless licenses to Rogers is fundamentally incompatible with our government’s policies for spectrum and mobile service competition, and I will simply not permit it.” But why should Canada prevent industries from extremely profitable mergers and acquisitions?

Ottawa’s main concern with this deal is the monopolization of essential services like cell phones and Internet. With a monopoly, Rogers is free to raise prices because no other competitor could offer a better price matching Rogers’ breadth of services. Many are concerned that they will not be able to compete with Rogers, and consumers worry they will suffer higher cell phone prices without other options. Rogers gave an assurance that it would not raise prices until at least years after the deal’s closing. But that assurance may not be enough to stop Rogers from continuing to competitors in the future, leaving fewer choices for Canadian consumers. Financial analysts acknowledge that while the government may try to reject the deal, the government’s statements are not necessarily fatal. predict that the deal will close, but, to maintain competition in the industry, Rogers will not be able to buy all of Shaw’s wireless business.

The Rogers-Shaw deal is likely moving ahead. On March 24, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (“CRTC”) Rogers’ acquisition. The CRTC stated that, subject to modifications, Rogers’ proposal would not unduly affect Canada’s competitive landscape. The CRTC made stipulations to its approval that could once again balance Rogers’ acquisition and fair competition in the wireless service marketplace. Rogers will contribute towards various initiatives promoting local news and independent projects. Rogers must also create an news team with journalists in all provinces to provide news content to First Nations, MĂ©tis, and Inuit communities. These stipulations could help stimulate local journalism and production companies, addressing concerns regarding the survival of local wireless services after this big merger.

While Canadian government officials seek to discourage anti-competitive behaviours, Canada’s Competition Act was last reviewed in . Since then, Internet giants like Google, Facebook, and Amazon have often participated in anti-competitive practices online to dominate the marketplace. In Canada, Google and Facebook pocket of online advertising revenues, yet no laws have come in to stop them. Minister Francois-Phillippe Champagne announced on , to modernize competition law through legislative reform of the Competition Act. Through a broad review, the Competition Bureau has suggested changing the in the current competition law. This defence saves mergers that harm competition so long as the deal creates cost savings or other efficiency gains. Rogers may rely on this defence to keep the deal moving forward. Though not yet rejected, the Rogers-Shaw deal may be a catalyst for Minister Francois-Phillippe Champagne to implement changes to competitive practices.

The post The Wi-Fi is A, B, or C—the Rogers-Shaw Deal: Limiting choice in a wireless marketplace? appeared first on IPOsgoode.

Photo by Ann H ()

Meena Alnajar is anÌęIPilogueÌęWriter, IP Innovation Clinic Fellow,Ìęand a 2L JD Candidate atÌęOsgoodeÌęHall Law School

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On February 11, 2022, a class action lawsuit against for double ticketing settled for $6 million dollars. People who used Airbnb for the first time since October 2015 may be eligible for up to $45 in credit. Vancouver resident filed the class action in 2017 on the basis that Airbnb appeared to charge Lin $122 a night for what he booked as a $108 night on the app. The act of charging a consumer the higher of two or more prices is known as and it is a criminal offence in Canada under Section 54 of the Competition Act. This class action signified that parties can be found guilty of double ticketing even in online spaces.

Double ticketing in Canadian law is described as charging a consumer the of two or more prices when it is expressed in the following ways: on a product (its wrapper or container), on anything attached to the product including anything on which the product is mounted for display or sale, on an in-store or other point-of-purchase display or advertisement. Online spaces, such as applications, are not explicitly included in that list as this section was first enacted in . The Section intends to prevent consumers from being by the prices they are charged. Interestingly, prices that are not in-store or at the point of purchase, such as newspaper ads, . This exclusion could give way to online sellers having different prices listed online, as these online prices appear to be neither in-store nor definitively at a point-of-purchase. The Airbnb class action helps clarify how courts may contemplate a Section 54 offence for online retailers.

In its initial arguments, claimed that double ticketing did not apply because the two prices for a single accommodation are the price of two different products. The first price reflects the actual accommodation offered by hosts to guests and the higher price is the listing service. found this pleading to be a mischaracterization of Airbnb’s own products and that it was not plain and obvious that these are two prices for two different products. Airbnb was found guilty of double ticketing, then the decision. On appeal in federal court, the parties reached a of $6 million dollars and Airbnb avoided admitting liability. Person(s) guilty of a Section 54 can face a maximum fine of up to $10,000 and/or a year’s imprisonment.

Justice Gascon also indicated that the class action’s Section 54 claim is and stretches Section 54’s potential interpretation. However, this class action is not the first Section 54 class action against online sales. On it was reported that a class action against WestJet for double ticketing was approved. In that action, the plaintiff argued that WestJet claimed in its published tariff that the would be free yet proceeded to charge passengers anyways. Businesses can take advantage of online sales by posting one price, then adding non-optional fees in the final checkout. The current provision, Section 54 of the Competition Act has not developed to include online price differences in the list of double ticketing offences. These emerging class actions demonstrate how case law can help adapt statutes to changing sale environments and serve as an expensive warning to retailers that hide fees to better market products online.

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On January 10, 2022, the Canadian Competition Bureau (the Bureau) and Health Canada’s Health Products and Food Branch (the HPFB) issued aÌęÌęto stakeholders on their continued collaboration to support Canadians’ access to safe, effective, and affordable pharmaceuticals and biologics.

Although the Bureau and HPFB are independent entities, they have complementary mandates in the pharmaceutical sector. The Bureau is responsible for administering and enforcing theÌęCompetition Act, which includes addressing competition issues for the pharmaceutical industry. While the HPFB regulates, evaluates, and monitors therapeutic products available in Canada under theÌęFood and Drugs Act. This overlap has led to past collaboration on several issues, including mergers and acquisitions, deceptive and misleading claims, and claims of abuse of dominance.

As part of their goal for continued collaboration, both entities plan to maintain a channel of communication to ensure the mutual success of their policy objectives. This includes having the Bureau report to the HPFB on aspects of the pharmaceutical regulatory framework that may impact competition, and the HPFB providing feedback to the Bureau when competition-related issues may result in problems for access to medicines.

The Bureau and HPFB have also committed to working together on Bureau-led enforcement actions, such as when generic pharmaceutical companies report having difficulty obtaining reference samples from branded drug manufacturers. These samples are necessary for generic companies to perform testing for regulatory approval and any difficulties in obtaining samples would delay market launch, with corresponding impact on drug availability. Both the Bureau and HPFB have released guidance for providing access to reference samples and plan to continue working together to monitor and address issues in this area. Based on the extent of guidance documents made available from both entities, branded drug manufacturers are advised to anticipate that the Bureau will treat any explanation for delay in supplying reference products with a high degree of skepticism.

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Students interested in trying out for Osgoode’s PADC team must submit answers to ourÌę in a Word document with your name in the file name toÌęiposgoode@osgoode.yorku.ca.

Each member of the team will receive up toÌę3 creditsÌęfor participating in the competition.ÌęPlease note that only 2L and 3L students may participate.ÌęPlease also note that under Academic Rule 4.3e, students may participate for credit in only one lawyer simulation competition in a given academic year unless they obtain permission from the Director of Mooting and Lawyering Simulations.

About the Patent Drafting Competition

Originally created in 2014 as a midwest competition, the Competition is today a national inter-law school competition designed to introduce law students to issues arising in United States patent law. Participants will have the opportunity to develop their patent prosecution skills by applying legal principles to a hypothetical invention scenario (“Invention Statement”) and appreciating the intricacies of drafting a patent specification and claims that are both patentable and valuable. Each team will complete a search pertaining to the Invention Statement, draft a utility patent application, and defend their decisions before a panel of judges comprising USPTO executives/personnel, patent practitioners, academia and/or special guest judges.

The Competition consists of regional rounds held virtually. The winner of each regional round will compete in the National Finals held at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia. Ìę

The Competition consists of regional rounds held virtually. The winner of each regional round will compete in the National Finals held at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia. Ìę

Invention statements will be released to teams on November 1, 2021. Team patent applications will be due on January 16, 2022. Regional virtual tryouts will be held on March 5, 2022, followed by the National Finals Competition on April 8, 2022.Ìę

Read about the experiences of the students on last year’s team here:Ìę

The complete set of rules for this year, can be found here:Ìę.

If you have further questions or would like more information, please email Ashley Moniz atÌęamoniz@osgoode.yorku.ca.

We look forward to another great year at the Patent Drafting Competition!

The post REMINDER: Tryouts for the USPTO National Patent Application Drafting Competition Team - DEADLINE TOMORROW appeared first on IPOsgoode.

Students enrolled in the moot have the distinct opportunity to be coached by lawyers at Cassels, Brock & Blackwell LLP and former Osgoode team members, receive guidance from faculty advisors who founded the moot, and, if selected for the oral rounds, practice in front of judges on IP Osgoode's Advisory Board.Ìę

We thank all interested applicants and continue to look forward to another great year in the Oxford Moot.

***

To try out, please refer to the fact problem attached to this email. Each entrant must prepareÌęskeleton arguments of no more than 3 double-spaced pagesÌę(excluding a table of authorities)Ìęaddressing the copyright issue on behalf of the appellantÌęinÌę. You will then be required to present a 10-minute oral argument, which will include responding to questions from the tryout judges.

Please contact Ashley Moniz (amoniz@osgoode.yorku.ca)Ìęas soon as possible to indicate your interest and receive further instructions.ÌęPlease include the following email subject heading in all communications: “Oxford Moot 2021/22 Tryouts – [FIRST & LAST NAME]”.

Following the tryouts, the Moots & Skills Program Director will contact successful applicants directly.

Please note that Rule 5.1(e) of the Academic Rules prohibits enrollment in more than one competitive lawyering simulation competition in any single academic year.

The team will be mentored by Prof. David Vaver and Prof. Pina D’Agostino and coached by a select team of IP practitioners on appellate advocacy. For their participation, students receive 3 graded credits for preparing their written arguments and 2 credits for the oral rounds if they advance. All credits are allocated to the Winter Term.

If you have any further questions, require special accommodations, or need more information, please email Ashley directly at amoniz@osgoode.yorku.ca.

Thank you for your interest, we look forward to another exciting year with the Oxford IP Moot!

The post Oxford IP Moot Tryouts EXTENDED appeared first on IPOsgoode.

Students interested in trying out for Osgoode’s PADC team must submit answers to our by 3 pm on Friday, October 22, 2021.Ìę Please send your answers in a Word document with your name in the file name to iposgoode@osgoode.yorku.ca.

ÌęEach member of the team will receive up to 3 credits for participating in the competition. Please note that only 2L and 3L students may participate.ÌęPlease also note that under Academic Rule 4.3e, students may participate for credit in only one lawyer simulation competition in a given academic year unless they obtain permission from the Director of Mooting and Lawyering Simulations.

About the Patent Drafting Competition

Originally created in 2014 as a midwest competition, the Competition is today a national inter-law school competition designed to introduce law students to issues arising in United States patent law. Participants will have the opportunity to develop their patent prosecution skills by applying legal principles to a hypothetical invention scenario (“Invention Statement”) and appreciating the intricacies of drafting a patent specification and claims that are both patentable and valuable. Each team will complete a search pertaining to the Invention Statement, draft a utility patent application, and defend their decisions before a panel of judges comprising USPTO executives/personnel, patent practitioners, academia and/or special guest judges.

The Competition consists of regional rounds held virtually. The winner of each regional round will compete in the National Finals held at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia. Ìę

The Competition consists of regional rounds held virtually. The winner of each regional round will compete in the National Finals held at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia. Ìę

Invention statements will be released to teams on November 1, 2021. Team patent applications will be due on January 16, 2022. Regional virtual tryouts will be held on March 5, 2022, followed by the National Finals Competition on April 8, 2022.Ìę

Read about the experiences of the students on last year’s team here:

The complete set of rules for this year, can be found here: .

If you have further questions or would like more information, please email Ashley Moniz at amoniz@osgoode.yorku.ca.

We look forward to another great year at the Patent Drafting Competition!

The post CALL FOR TRYOUTS - USPTO National Patent Application Drafting Competition appeared first on IPOsgoode.

To try out, please refer to the fact problem attached to this email. Each entrant must prepare skeleton arguments of no more than 3 double-spaced pages (excluding a table of authorities) addressing the copyright issue on behalf of the appellant in . You will then be required to present a 10-minute oral argument, which will include responding to questions from the tryout judges.

Please contact Ashley Moniz (amoniz@osgoode.yorku.ca) by Monday to indicate your interest and availability via Zoom between 1pm and 5pm on October 5^th and 7^th. Following this, you will have until October 4^th at 3pm to send us your skeleton arguments. Please include the following email subject heading in all communications: “Oxford Moot 2021/22 Tryouts – [FIRST & LAST NAME]”.

Following the tryouts, the Moots & Skills Program Director will contact successful applicants directly.

Please note that Rule 5.1(e) of the Academic Rules prohibits enrollment in more than one competitive lawyering simulation competition in any single academic year.

The team will be mentored by Prof. David Vaver and Prof. Pina D’Agostino and coached by a select team of IP practitioners on appellate advocacy. For their participation, students receive 3 graded credits for preparing their written arguments and 2 credits for the oral rounds if they advance. All credits are allocated to the Winter Term.

If you have any further questions, require special accommodations, or need more information, please email Ashley directly at amoniz@osgoode.yorku.ca.

Thank you for your interest, we look forward to another exciting year with the Oxford IP Moot!

The post REMINDER: Oxford IP Moot Tryouts are Next Week! appeared first on IPOsgoode.

At the beginning of 2020, when the team was first scheduled to compete, compulsory licensing seemed like a fun thought experiment and a great theoretical moot problem about balancing IP rights and public health. It quickly became an eerily relevant issue as the world rapidly shut down and essential medical items like masks, gloves, and ventilators became precious commodities. Doors stayed shut, Wi-Fi capacity limits got tested, and in the wake of the initial disbelief that the world was collectively at war with the most covert of enemies, there was little room to feel disappointment about the cancellation of the competition. As the months wore on, and a new normalcy crystallized, the team got word that the competition was back on, and that the 2020 competitors were invited to return. Two of the team members came back, and a third joined ranks in January of 2021.

The moot organizers pivoted to a Zoom format and accommodated its largest set of teams to date, with 32 schools battling for the title. The first day entailed a virtual welcome ceremony. Moments after the team’s alarm clocks screamed to life at 6:30 am, each member logged into Zoom, sleepy-eyed and afflicted with the most serious cases of bed head. As the organizer scrolled through the competing teams’ slides, it slowly became apparent that Osgoode had miscalculated. Slide after slide passed through the platform, with many a suit and rarely a smile. Then Osgoode’s slide came roaring in with a beaver, a moose, and what appeared to be a team member drinking maple syrup straight from the bottle. Whatever impression they made, the Ozzies quickly made it clear that they meant business.Ìę

The preliminaries were also no laughing matter, as the competition was fierce. Thankfully, Osgoode was blessed with the platinum package for coaching and the preliminaries were passed through with a breeze. As the team advanced on, excitement in the Osgoode community rose. The team entered the final match, buttressed with support from all angles in the Oz community, the IP space, and from their collective friends and family. The online format uniquely allowed all supporters to watch their team in action, and we felt the love. While Osgoode ultimately lost out in the grand final, the opportunity to experience this competition was a big “W”.

To our 2020 team member, Julianna Felendzer, we hope we did you proud. Thanks for helping us secure the invite to the oral rounds!

To our coaches Jennifer Davidson, Stephen Selznick, Any Obando and Giuseppina D’Agostino, we are forever grateful for your dedication and your support, especially when it was just a “hair toss, check your nails” kind of day!

Co-written by Anna Morrish, Alex Dumais, and Karin Kazakevich, 2021 Oxford International Intellectual Property Law Moot Runners Up

The post A Year in the Life of Three Oxford Moot Finalists appeared first on IPOsgoode.